I have been, since the beginning of the pandemic, an ardent supporter of sanitary measures, even the less obvious, such as the curfew. In war as in war, I said to myself, while knowing that this combat remained of low intensity compared to armed conflicts. Would I have sinned, in doing so, by a Hobbesian conception of life – of the English philosopher Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) – which, for fear of death, justifies attacks on freedom?
This is the surprising thesis developed by political scientist Jean-François Caron in The great containment. Lthe West and the fear of death (PUL, 2022, 144 pages). Caron lives in Kazakhstan, where he teaches at Nazarbayev University. Since the start of the pandemic, he has published three very illuminating short essays on the ins and outs of the crisis. His books, always dense and clear, have been beacons in the storm for those who wanted to understand, beyond the daily reports, the deep political issues at stake in this affair.
In his first two works on the subject, particularly in irresponsible citizenship (PUL, 2021), Caron, a supporter of liberalism, noted a crisis of political authority which he attributed to abuses of this very doctrine. By absolutely defending their individual rights in defiance of the common good, many citizens of our democracies would have fueled, as a reaction, an increased demand for coercive measures, a trend that is not without concern for the future of liberalism. To perpetuate itself, explained Caron, the latter requires that individuals know how to constrain themselves freely in case of necessity, which those refractory to sanitary measures have not been able to do, thus threatening the freedom of all.
In The great containment, Caron seems to change his tune and affirms “that the decisions taken by the States to fight against this virus were disproportionate to the threat”. Surprised by this change of course, I asked him for an explanation. Even if he lives on the other side of the world, the political scientist – this is one of his qualities – is always available and does not slip away.
At the start of the pandemic, he explains, we were right to fear the virus, to be afraid of dying; the Hobbesian conception of life was therefore justified. Over time, however, we have come to understand that the virus, while it is dangerous for the elderly and those who already have health problems — obesity, diabetes, etc. —, proves for the others “a completely acceptable risk which no longer justifies the exceptional behavior that we had in 2020”. Responsible citizenship, in this sense, therefore requires today to learn to live with the virus by reserving health measures for the most fragile among us.
Caron now calls the measures taken at the start of the pandemic a “mistake”, given what we have since learned about the virus. I do not share this finding. In the uncertainty, it seems to me that wisdom demanded the greatest caution. Should the state of siege be maintained? This is where Caron’s new book becomes interesting, beyond the pandemic conjuncture.
The crisis, notes the political scientist, has revealed two strong tendencies in our democratic societies: the panic fear of death, or the refusal of “the eminently tragic nature of human life”, and a frenzied individualism resulting from the “revolution of rights of the 1960s, a combination that gives what Caron calls the Hobbesian conception of life.
Our absolute refusal of death, always considered an injustice regardless of the circumstances, and our obsession with personal fulfillment explain the current devaluation of the notion of sacrifice, the decline of collective struggles — the cause of national liberation, in particular — , the rise of an eco-anxiety that is more messy than political, a strong sense of social isolation that is accompanied by a deterioration of mental health and a loss of meaning in life, as well as a paradoxical desire, in case of crisis, of an authoritarian regime.
“If survival is inherent in animal life, writes Caron, an authentically human life implies on the contrary to rise to a higher level and to act in such a way as to generate happiness for oneself and for others. »
Against the Hobbesian conception, Caron therefore argues instead for a conception of life inspired by Aristotle and by the English philosopher John Locke (1632-1704), according to which “the experience of a truly human life requires other people and a dedication to the general interest of society, which, in turn, will value commitment and, if necessary, sacrifice”, all freely chosen.
Fear and withdrawal must come to an end.