[Chronique de François Brousseau] What does Beijing want?

“Involuntary” drift of a meteorological probe? Serious espionage? Testing adversary (enemy) defenses and warning systems? War of nerves? Trial balloon?

The episode of the Chinese probe over the United States comes at a delicate moment in Sino-American relations, when the fear of an accidental escalation is more present.

A word on the apparent step backwards represented by the use, in the era of satellites and hypersonic aircraft, of balloons, the first geostrategic uses of which date back more than two centuries: European wars at the end of the 18e century (Battle of Fleurus, 1794); American Civil War (1861-1865).

Spy balloons, which fly at a height varying between 20 and 40 km above sea level, would experience in this XXIe century a new youth, in China and the United States, precisely. They are certainly slow, detectable and subjected (relatively) to the winds, but they have several advantages.

They cost infinitely less than satellites (construction and launch operations). They can, because of their slowness and their low altitude, see details that would escape satellites (and ultra-fast planes). They can also, beyond the video-photographic imagery, go there with soundings and impossible recordings at 500 or 1000 km altitude. The latest models, finally, can maneuver through the winds, like the most skilled sailboat pilots. This refutes the “accidental drift” explanation.

As at the end of the 1940s between the United States and the USSR, we are at the dawn of a new cold war. This time, between the declining but persistent power of the United States and the rising but uncertain power of China…perhaps more clumsy and less assured than we think.

Beijing denounced the “exaggerated reaction” of the American army, after the decision to shoot down the intruder. However, it is rather a mutual exercise of diplomatic restraint that we have been witnessing for three days.

The aerostat will have had time to “drift” at an altitude of 19 km above an entire continent before the order is finally given to shoot it down. However, this low-altitude overflight of a machine probably stuffed with sensors and cameras represented a clear violation of sovereignty.

But at the same time, despite protests from Washington and the postponement of the trip to Beijing by the head of American diplomacy, we sense throughout this episode a desire to avoid escalation.

On the Chinese side, there is the simple fact that we expressed regrets (almost apologies)… certainly invoking a fanciful explanation. “We regret what happened and will continue to communicate with the US side to manage this situation. One could imagine a more aggressive response; they can and often do. The “fighter wolves” of Chinese diplomacy (during the first phase of the pandemic), as well as the Chinese daily GlobalTimeshave made us heavily accustomed to it.

On the American side, the intruder was not immediately shot down (there was certainly a non-political reason: to avoid the dangerous fall of debris), while he was on a probable intelligence mission. The balloon is known to have flown over a missile storage base in Montana. We also suspect “electromagnetic espionage” to test the frequencies of the adversary.

There may also have been – the hypothesis does not exclude the above – a desire to test American vigilance and defenses, to measure how long the operation could last before being intercepted.

Despite the immense Russian “distraction” in Ukraine, the Sino-American relationship remains at the heart of the 21e century. Despite all the contentious issues (trade, Taiwan, Ukraine, etc.), there is a concern to avoid direct confrontation and to cooperate on certain points.

At the Sharm el-Sheikh summit (COP 27), we saw this fall the Chinese and American representatives reconnect, after three months of sulking from Beijing, because of Nancy Pelosi in Taiwan.

On the sidelines of the G20 in Bali, Biden and Xi met. The two countries have agreed to put in place procedures and mechanisms to avoid finding themselves, after a case like this, in front of a Sino-American “Cuba 1962”.

Despite the fundamental and objective differences between these two countries in the 21ste century, China and the United States want to believe that it is possible to have both disagreements, even confrontations, on very important subjects, while cooperating on others and avoiding the rise to extremes.

The world today fears Vladimir Putin and his nuclear button, but the real heavy trends of the century are not there.

François Brousseau is an international business analyst at Ici Radio-Canada.

[email protected]

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