A former senior civil servant and leading national security researcher says Canada can look to Australia for ideas on how to better manage the threat of foreign interference.
Ottawa should “copy and paste” Australia’s 2018 law that requires people lobbying on behalf of other countries to register with the government, said Michael Wernick, who served as Clerk of the Privy Council from 2016 to 2019.
The detailed public threat assessments of the Australian Security Intelligence Organization (ASIO), Australia’s intelligence service, could also serve as a model in Canada for explaining the elements of foreign interference, added Wesley Wark, senior researcher at the Center for International Governance Innovation.
The Liberal government has come under pressure in recent weeks to explain what Canada is doing about allegations of Chinese interference – disclosed in anonymous leaks to media from security sources – in the past two federal elections.
In the normal course of relations, countries will criticize other nations or make decisions that could be damaging, but this is overt behavior that could simply be called “aggressive diplomacy”, Wark pointed out.
Actions cross the threshold of foreign interference when carried out covertly.
A foreign government like China, for example, might try to target diaspora communities to encourage them to adopt pro-China positions, or silence them with threats, Wark noted.
This could spill over into the electoral arena if Beijing clandestinely encourages a community of Canadians to support candidates who might favor a more pro-China stance or undermine the legitimacy of candidates whose views do not sit well with China.
In addition to passing the Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme Act in 2018, Australia has taken a number of other steps, including appointing a National Foreign Interference Coordinator and establishing a task force bringing together security and police services to discover, disrupt and investigate foreign interference activities.
“It would be a good thing if our political parties got together and dealt with this in the national interest,” Wernick said.
A protocol in place
Under a federal election protocol, there would be a public announcement if a group of senior officials determined that an incident – or a series of incidents – threatened Canada’s ability to hold a free and fair vote.
There was no such announcement regarding the 2019 or 2021 elections. In both cases, the Liberals returned to government with minority mandates while the Conservatives formed the official opposition.
A report by former civil servant Morris Rosenberg, released on Tuesday, found that several aspects of the protocol were working well in 2021. However, he flagged communication as one of the areas for improvement.
“Many comments were made about the need for an early announcement to clearly communicate to Canadians and the media the threat, the integrated plan in place to deal with it, and the role of the Protocol and Panel of Experts. as part of this plan,” the report said.
Lack of transparency
Federal agencies, including the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, have shown no willingness to be truly open and transparent about the threats facing the country, according to Wesley Wark.
“They still don’t see it as their business, informing the public, argued the researcher. So we get drip reports, but nothing really substantial and nothing systematic. »
By comparison, the head of Australia’s ASIO gives an annual speech outlining these threats.
In his most recent speech, delivered last month, Chief Security Officer Mike Burgess said Australia faces an unprecedented challenge of espionage and foreign interference “and I am not convinced that we as a nation fully understand the damage it is inflicting on Australia’s security, democracy, sovereignty, economy and social fabric”.
“Last year, we identified several spies from several countries developing and trying to leverage relationships with government officials, bank employees, doctors, police employees and other professions to obtain personal details. suspected dissidents. »
He also provided details of two recent plots of foreign interference, saying the two were arrested “before any harm could be done”.
Real damage?
There is an “important distinction” between a foreign state’s intentions and capabilities, “which I think has completely disappeared in this current hype about Chinese election interference,” Wark noted.
Leaked intelligence about China’s intention to intervene in the Canadian election does not necessarily reveal anything about what damage, if any, has actually been done.
This can cast doubt both on the loyalty of the Chinese diaspora community and on people’s ability to make up their own minds in the political sphere, Wark added.
“Both of these suggestions are deeply anti-democratic and actually serve Chinese goals in a way that I believe is not subject to comment. »