Concerns among Syrian minority groups, including Christians, Alawites, Shiites, and Druze, have intensified following the potential fall of Bashar al-Assad. Skepticism surrounds Islamist factions’ promises of protection and religious freedom, with many recalling past violence. Demographic shifts favoring Sunni Muslims have altered power dynamics, exacerbating existing tensions. Despite Assad’s claims of minority protection, many feel abandoned as the regime’s support dwindles amid ongoing conflict and territorial losses to rebel forces.
Concerns Among Syrian Minorities Post-Assad
Following the downfall of Bashar al-Assad, various religious groups in Syria, including Christians, Alawites, Shiites, and Druze, are apprehensive about the rise of Islamist factions in Damascus. The promises made by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) regarding the protection of minority groups and the assurance of religious freedoms are met with skepticism. Many recall the violent incidents during the civil war when Islamist groups targeted Christian and Alawite neighborhoods. The Alawites, especially, are doubtful about HTS’s commitment to safeguarding their interests, given their historical context.
According to Syria expert Heiko Wimmen from the International Crisis Group, “During the offensive on Damascus, HTS leader Abu Mohammed al-Julani attempted to alleviate the fears of minority communities.” After Aleppo’s capture, loudspeaker trucks reassured Christians that they were safe. So far, Aleppo, Homs, and Damascus have experienced minimal violence against minorities. However, Wimmen notes that many Alawites have fled rebel control in Homs and Damascus, seeking refuge in predominantly Alawite coastal areas or Shiite neighborhoods in southern Beirut, which are under Hezbollah’s influence. This represents a significant shift for the Alawites, who have been integral to the Syrian military and governance for decades.
The Shift in Syria’s Demographics
Syria is home to a rich tapestry of ethnic and religious identities, and the ascent of Sunni Islamists has resulted in a profound shift in the power dynamics within the country. While the exact future remains uncertain, it is likely that even if HTS adheres to its promises of non-retaliation against Alawites, Christians, Druze, and Shiites, the inter-group relationships will undergo a lasting transformation. Tensions among these communities have been present long before the war, and the actions of both the regime and rebel groups have only intensified prevailing mistrust.
Before the outbreak of the war, Arab Sunnis constituted approximately 65 percent of Syria’s population of around 22 million, while Alawites comprised about 10 percent. The Alawites, followers of a distinct branch of Shiite Islam, have historically faced rejection from many Sunni Muslims. The Assad family, which has ruled Syria since 1971, is Alawite and primarily resides along the Mediterranean coast near Latakia. The Kurdish population in the northeast made up about 15 percent, with Christians accounting for another 5 percent, mainly concentrated in urban areas like Aleppo and Damascus. The Druze represented roughly 3 percent of the population, primarily in the southern region around Suweida.
Over the years, the demographic composition has evolved, with the proportion of Christians, Druze, and Alawites steadily declining. French geographer Fabrice Balanche, who has extensively studied Syria’s ethnic groups, emphasizes that the Arab Sunni population has surged due to higher birth rates, while the numbers of Christians, Druze, and Alawites have diminished due to lower birth rates and emigration. This demographic shift has contributed to rising tensions and was a factor in the civil war’s eruption.
In response to the increasing Sunni dominance, Bashar al-Assad positioned himself as a defender of religious minorities and a promoter of religious tolerance. Under his secular Baath Party regime, Christians enjoyed relative freedom to practice their faith and maintain their places of worship. Nevertheless, the authoritarian nature of the regime meant that all groups, including Christians, Druze, Shiites, and Alawites, faced oppression should they challenge the government.
During the initial protests in March 2011, citizens from various religious backgrounds united in their demands for change. However, the regime sought to cast the uprising in sectarian terms, instilling fear among Alawites and Christians regarding a potential Sunni takeover. It labeled opponents as religious extremists, aiming to manipulate sectarian divisions to galvanize support for its continued rule.
The regime’s strategy included releasing thousands of Islamists from prison and allegedly deploying provocateurs to incite religious tensions at protests. By fostering sectarian divisions, the Assad regime compelled Alawites and Christians to rally around him. Balanche asserts that the regime has long exploited existing tensions for its own gain, exacerbating divisions that were already present within Syrian society.
Leadership roles within the government and military predominantly went to Alawites, leading to widespread resentment against them. Despite the Sunni majority in the army, a disproportionate number of officers were Alawites, creating further bitterness. While there were Sunnis in significant positions, actual control remained firmly within the Assad family’s Alawite sphere.
The Alawites have borne the brunt of the conflict, with a staggering number of casualties reported in their coastal villages. Balanche notes that approximately one in three men in these areas has perished in the war. Although Alawites are often perceived as affluent and powerful, many have faced the same hardships as others during the war, struggling with poverty and inflation. Discontent has grown among Alawites regarding the perceived corruption and profiteering of high-ranking officials within Assad’s inner circle, who have amassed wealth while ordinary citizens and soldiers paid a heavy price.
While Assad presented himself as a guardian of minority rights, his inability to deliver on that promise has left many feeling abandoned. As conflict escalated and more regions fell to rebel control, the regime’s support for minority communities waned, leaving them to navigate their fates amidst a turbulent landscape.