Is not the first duty of those who wage war to know their enemy? Exactly two years ago, Russia invaded Ukraine, throwing Europe into its biggest armed conflict since 1945. In Russia, where it is even forbidden to pronounce the word “war” under penalty of imprisonment, we are resurrected the myth of the Great Patriotic War (1941-1945), even calling for the “denazification” of Ukraine. On the American side, the vocabulary of the Cold War has returned to use, and it is not uncommon to hear Vladimir Putin compared to Adolf Hitler.
One of the greatest Russian poets of the 19th centurye century, Fyodor Tyutchev, said that one could not “understand Russia through reason”. Jean-Robert Raviot, who has just published Russian Imperial Software at L’Artilleur, made the opposite bet. This specialist in contemporary Russia at the University of Paris Nanterre and former director of the French university colleges of Moscow and Saint Petersburg has undertaken to situate this conflict in the long history of this country which, for at least two centuries, has been in the West the object of all fantasies.
“The problem with Russia in the Western world is that we grasp it more through the fantasies it arouses than through reality,” he says. And this is nothing new. It starts in the 19th centurye century, from the moment when the Russian autocratic regime defended a very conservative vision of European politics and order. Russia is then assimilated to a sort of retrograde and archaic power. Europe – and in particular France – will then apply a certain number of clichés to Russia. »
Imperial grandeur, but fragile
Not everything is false in these representations, says Professor Raviot. But they ignore software which does not date from the invasion of Ukraine and goes back through the centuries.
“Modern Russia is heir to the USSR, which is itself heir to the Russian Empire. This was formed from the end of the 15th centurye century around Moscow. From the beginning, it saw itself as an empire. Russia will always be an expansion of Muscovy through the absorption of new territories and different peoples, until it becomes a continental state both geographically, geopolitically and even climatically. »
Russia will be multi-ethnic from the middle of the 16th centurye century, with the conquest of the Kazan Tatars and the remains of the Mongolian Golden Horde. It absorbs Muslim, non-Slavic and non-Christian territories. It is an empire, in the Roman sense of the term, which will capture the archaic heritage of the Byzantine Empire and adopt its political symbols, such as the two-headed eagle.
According to Jean-Robert Raviot, a certain Russian historiography claims that there is continuity between kyiv and Moscow. But in reality, affirms the professor, the modern Russian state is the heir not of kyiv, but of Moscow, the one and only center of this empire which has a natural vocation to be a pole of power on a global scale. Although it was legally abolished in 1917, the USSR would recover it and take over certain features. Same thing for the Russian Federation, born in 1991.
For the researcher, the Russian Federation is what he calls a post-empire. “Breaking a break with the USSR and the Russian Empire, it retains certain imperial forms and must manage in its internal and foreign policy an imperial heritage that is still present. This character is particularly evident with neighboring republics. By practicing a form of defensive imperialism, the Russian state’s main objective is to maintain itself. »
Because this image of imperial grandeur actually conceals great fragility. Russia has always been a state on the verge of crumbling and fears dismemberment, explains Jean-Robert Raviot. Because of the immensity of its territories which it is unable to populate, it remains a difficult state to govern and which, during the 20the century, collapsed twice (1917 and 1991). Without forgetting June 1941, when German troops were 30 kilometers from Moscow.
“This awareness of the fragility of the State is very strong among the population, and it underlies this patriotism which seems grandiose and derisory to us, but which remains very significant. In the West, we perceive the end of the USSR as a liberation, but for Russians it was a terrible economic, demographic and social crisis. The elites who came to power with Putin in the 1990s consider it a betrayal, an unacceptable break with a certain Soviet power which was respected around the world. »
Putin is not crazy
To fully understand what is happening today, we must understand the foundations of the State and the mentalities resulting from history. “People who say Putin is crazy are talking nonsense. Putin’s speech is that of many Russians, and in particular of those in the state structure,” says Professor Raviot.
“Even though he contradicts our vision of a country that should be “liberated”, he speaks to a very large majority of Russians, for whom this speech is that of common sense. The regime may be authoritarian, but it remains supported by a majority that remains loyal to it. After the initial astonishment, the majority perceived this war as a defensive war — not against Zelensky, but against NATO. Those who dream of overthrowing Putin are only revealing their ignorance of Russia. »
You should know that, in history, it is through Ukraine and Belarus that all invasions have taken place. Ukraine is therefore seen as a bulwark; it must be protected. These theses echo those of the great American political scientist John Mearsheimer as well as the diplomat George F. Kennan.
“Henry Kissinger understood that Russia had to be accommodated in one way or another,” explains Jean-Robert Raviot. He said that it was better to play balances with three rather than two. Clinton and a group of neoconservatives opted for an offensive strategy. The problem is that if this was the strategy [à adopter], it should have been done sooner. Today it is too late, because Russia has become a power again. »
The failure of sanctions
In the 2000s and 2010s, the country experienced a real economic recovery: this is why the sanctions were a failure. As early as March 2014, Russia adopted a series of laws to prepare for it. In 2018, she was ready. Between 2020 and 2022, its trade with China more than doubled, and the latter is now fully assuming its support for Russia.
For Jean-Robert Raviot, it is always surprising to hear Western governments treat Vladimir Putin as an “extremist nationalist”, as Stephen Harper did in his time, since national software has always been foreign to Russian political culture – as the writer Alexander Solzhenitsyn had also lamented.
“In 2017, with all the religious leaders and with a lot of street prayers, he inaugurated in Moscow the largest mosque in Europe after that of Istanbul. We are far from the clichés of far-right Russian nationalism! Putin is not the least bit nationalist! Rather, he considers himself to be the bearer of a civilization. This shows how the degree of disconnection from reality is very strong. »
While the Ukrainian conflict has entered into a war of attrition, Professor Raviot does not believe that it will be able to drag on: he finds it difficult to see how Europe could not one day reconnect with Russia, whose she is a natural partner. “I remain optimistic, because I believe that this war will not last forever. Unlike Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia and Transnistria, the front line is still 1000 kilometers long! From a military-strategic point of view, this cannot last forever. For now, Ukraine must hold out until the US elections. We’ll see after… “