Did the West promise the Russians not to expand NATO to the borders of Russia when the Eastern bloc collapsed over 30 years ago? This question has taken a dramatic turn in recent weeks with regard to Ukraine’s possible accession to the Atlantic Alliance.
It is because Russian President Vladimir Putin is convinced that the constant progression of NATO’s borders towards Russia threatens the security, if not the survival, of his country. Thirty years ago, these borders were located 1,200 kilometers from Saint Petersburg. Today they are 100 kilometers away. If Ukraine falls into the western camp, NATO will point its arms at the heart of Russia.
Hence the anger of the head of the Kremlin who never ceases to recall that, in the 1990s, Western leaders had given oral assurances to Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin on the non-expansion of NATO to the East. These assurances, he says, have always been violated.
Is Putin right? The answer is yes. It is important here to keep in mind the chronology of events and the words spoken by each other to fully understand the origins of the current crisis. The American historian Mary Elise Sarotte helps us to see clearly. She has just spent years going through the archives, reading the handwritten notes and speeches of the main protagonists, as well as the minutes of their meetings. The result of this meticulous work is a fascinating work published a few days ago: Not One Inch. America, Russia, and the Making of Post-Cold War Stalemate.
Fall of the Berlin wall
It all started a few weeks after the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989. In Washington, President George Bush Sr. wondered what the security of the European continent would look like. Several Warsaw Pact countries are calling for NATO membership. In the halls of the State Department, there is talk of admitting Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia, and Bush is even eyeing the three Baltic states. But not all Western leaders are on the same page, at least initially.
In Germany, Chancellor Helmut Kohl has only one obsession in mind: the reunification of the two Germanies. Therefore, the issue of NATO enlargement will be played out around this issue. At the start of 1990, the Soviet Union was still standing and fielding half a million troops in East Germany.
The West must offer something to Moscow if they want to get the Soviet troops to leave and the maintenance of a reunited Germany in NATO.
German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher gets the ball rolling with a speech in January. “I want NATO,” he said, “to state unequivocally that no matter what happens in the Warsaw Pact, there will be no expansion of NATO territory to the east,” that is, closer to the borders of the Soviet Union. ”
Verbal promise
On February 9, at two separate events, the Germans and the Americans made a verbal promise. Genscher agrees: whatever happens to the Warsaw Pact, he says, “an expansion of NATO territory to the east, that is, closer to the borders of the Soviet Union, will not take place” . At the same time, in Moscow, US Secretary of State James Baker meets with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. During the conversation, he offers her a deal in the form of a question: “Would you prefer that a reunified Germany be linked to NATO, with the assurance that NATO territory will never be moved, would be? an inch east from its current position? To which Gorbachev replies: “Any expansion of the NATO area is not acceptable. Baker nods, “We agree on that. None of this is written, but from these statements the spirit must be drawn.
“Not an inch” east, Baker said. And yet, NATO expanded in 1999 and then in 2004. Why? Mary Elise Sarotte puts forward several explanations, one of which sums up the whole situation: the West took advantage of Russia’s weakness under Gorbachev and Yeltsin. As soon as German reunification was achieved, the American desire to expand NATO returned to center stage in the aftermath of the break-up of the Soviet Union in December 1991.
The fragmentation of the old superpower has given birth to a diminished Russia where the new president, Boris Yeltsin, has focused all his energy on domestic issues.
He constantly sought and obtained money from the Germans and the Americans in order to support an economy on the verge of collapse and to ensure his retention in power. He was not in a position to really oppose NATO enlargement.
Did the reorganization of the post-Cold War European security system require the enlargement of NATO? The American historian writes that the West had other options and “missed a chance to define a relationship where Russia would be a true partner in Europe.”
The history of NATO enlargement shows how the game of the great powers is an arena where only the defense of interests counts. The West has ignored Russia’s security interests. The West had won the Cold War, Russia had to submit. Putin has learned the lesson. Since coming to power 20 years ago, he has strengthened his country, straightened out his army, established his red lines. He is now ready for battle.
* Jocelyn Coulon was political advisor to the Minister of Foreign Affairs in 2016-2017. He just published Canada in search of an international identity.