Several media reports1 over the past few days have reported negotiations between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis, who have been clashing violently for nearly eight years in Yemen. Is there a glimmer of hope? Can we believe that this war, which has caused one of the worst humanitarian disasters in the world, could have a happy ending this year after years of fruitless peace efforts?
Yemen, long plagued by instability and violence, entered the current phase of the war in 2014, when the Houthis, then rebels based in the northwest, seized the capital, Sanaa. Saudi Arabia, already worried about the unstable situation in its southern neighbor, then becomes even more anxious because of the growing relations between its great rival, Iran, and the Houthis. Riyadh therefore launched a military intervention in March 2015 to counter Houthi advances and restore the internationally recognized government.
The intervention, however, is a disaster for Saudi Arabia. Almost eight years later, the Houthis still control the northwest of the country and are more powerful than ever.
The UN may well promote a peace process, but nothing works. Despite the devastation of the war, the major parties do not seriously engage in it.
The belligerents nevertheless accepted a truce in April 2022. If the negotiations seeking to extend it failed in October, the main parties to the conflict have since extended it informally, despite certain incidents.
Belligerents camped on their positions
Could the recent talks between the Houthis and Saudi Arabia succeed in laying the groundwork for a more sustainable peace process? By identifying the motivations on both sides, we understand why the answer is unfortunately negative. Indeed, neither Riyadh nor the Houthis really want to build an inclusive peace.
For its part, Saudi Arabia has understood that it will not succeed in defeating the Houthis militarily. It therefore seeks to disengage, while minimizing the costs of its disastrous adventurism.
For their part, the Houthis, with Iranian support that has become much more important since 2015, are now dominant in Yemen. They therefore have no intention of making serious concessions to Saudi Arabia or the internationally recognized government, now dispersed between Aden (southern metropolis), Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. The truce represents for them not a first step towards a lasting peace, but an opportunity to catch their breath, consolidate their gains and prepare new offensives.
In this context, could the current talks at the very least lead to a renewal of the truce between the Houthis and Saudi Arabia? Several obstacles have been erected, including the intransigence of the Houthis. The discussions nevertheless seem to have some momentum, which suggests that an agreement is possible in the coming weeks. Such an outcome could certainly stabilize the situation and even reduce the violence, at least in the short term.
An understanding between Riyadh and the Houthis might, on the other hand, not be desirable from the perspective of building a lasting and inclusive peace.
In the absence of a peace process that would bring together all the key players around the negotiating table, and not just these two protagonists, a Houthi-Riyadh agreement could inflame the situation.
First, the internationally recognized government would inevitably feel betrayed by Riyadh, its main source of support. This government is, in fact, partially fictitious: it is above all a heterogeneous grouping of factions united by their opposition to the Houthis and which are distinguished by internal divisions and corruption; their inability to build a consolidated front remains one of the main causes of the Houthi successes. There is therefore every reason to believe that its reaction to such an agreement would be suspicious and possibly hostile.
The consequences would also be difficult in the south, independent between 1967 and 1990. Separatist sentiment, already widespread, has been mobilized a lot since 2015, in particular thanks to the support of the United Arab Emirates. The Southern Transitional Council, whose independence ambitions are no secret, is today the dominant force in the southwest. A direct agreement between Riyadh and the Houthis could therefore encourage him to make secessionist gestures. A new independent South Yemen may be inevitable, but the separation will not be harmonious.
Finally, such an agreement would consecrate the domination of the Houthis over the northwest of the country. This may be another inevitable result. But their governance is proving increasingly repressive, corrupt and obscurantist. It would then be just another tragic development for the Yemeni people, already exhausted by decades of violence and poor governance.
* Thomas Juneau published Yemen at war (Presses de l’Université de Montréal) in the general public collection Le monde en poche, edited by CÉRIUM.