The best way to win a war, ultimately, is to make sure the enemy generals are working for you. It is no other way that Mao Zedong succeeded in taking, in 1949, the whole of Chinese territory and pushing back to the island of Taiwan what remained of Chiang Kai-shek’s nationalist army.
In their breathtaking Mao. The unknown story (Gallimard), the authors Jung Chang and Jon Halliday recount that, on the three fronts of the civil war, Mao fought first against a general who had been a communist mole for decades, then against a general whose two advisers were undercover agents, finally against a depressed general who wanted to end the war. The infiltration of the nationalists by the Soviets and Mao’s secret service was the key element of victory.
The Great Helmsman (one of Mao’s nicknames) also wanted to push the offensive and take the rebel island immediately. He asked Stalin, whose military aid had hitherto been unsuspected and indispensable to him, to lend him planes and submarines for the final attack. Mao could count, he said, on a large number of Communist agents infiltrating the island. If Stalin had not feared, at this precise moment, an additional confrontation with Washington, Taiwan would have been quickly swallowed up.
This reminder raises an essential question about the future strategy for the capture of Taiwan by Mao’s successor, Xi Jinping. To what extent will the patient work of infiltrating Taiwan by the Chinese secret services for more than 70 years allow Beijing to pick the Taiwanese fruit from within? Because the Chinese services have made this eventuality a priority.
Over the past decade, according to a count by the Reuters news agency, no less than 21 officers, from the rank of captain to the close guard of the presidency of the republic, have been convicted of spying for China. Nine others are on trial, including three senior officers hitherto attached to the military counterintelligence services. In short, the Chinese had infiltrated the office responsible for preventing Chinese infiltration. No one can know whether these arrests are a small or a large part of the undercover iceberg.
The Taiwanese defense is making an immense effort to track down these spies. In the military barracks, posters promising rewards of $160,000 for the denunciation of a suspect are stuck above the urinals. A soap opera describing the techniques of recruiting Chinese agents — especially women — is produced and broadcast every week. Listening is mandatory for soldiers and officers. Retired officers, several of whom have been seen traveling to China at the regime’s invitation, are now being harshly punished if they re-offend.
One thing is certain: at the outbreak of a Chinese invasion, the ability of infiltrators to sabotage the Taiwanese defense, to make it make bad strategic and tactical decisions, would have a major impact on the outcome of the conflict. Especially since the geography of the island, with very steep coasts, makes a traditional attack militarily costly.
Taiwan is also the constant target of cyberattacks from China, which has become a master in the field. But all of these internet flybites may just be a diversion to mask a much bigger operation that would aim to bring the island’s civilian and military infrastructure offline at the time of the invasion. The manual The Science of Chinese Army Military Strategy foresees, in the event of a military offensive, the need to “paralyze the enemy’s operational systems” and to “sabotage the command”. Cyberattacks would also target political, economic and civilian targets.
Another component is to nurture defeatism. There is no doubt that the invasion of Taiwan will be very costly for Xi Jinping’s China, in terms of human and economic losses, sanctions, international political isolation — temporary, but real. But Xi is playing for his place in long history, not for the medium-term GDP growth rate. Even if the United States took part in the conflict, China’s inexhaustible human and military resources would ultimately prevail. It is therefore essential for Beijing to bring out, from the beginning of the conflict, credible Taiwanese voices affirming that defeat is certain, that there is no point in destroying the country and shedding blood in a lost battle, demanding rapid surrender and negotiation of the terms of submission.
Beijing has been making a considerable effort for several years to promote elected municipal officials who are in favor of good understanding and who, when the time is right, will be able to present themselves as these voices of reason. The 2020 election served as a launching pad, with a social media offensive favoring candidates more sympathetic to Beijing. The operation also included waves of disinformation and illegal financing, as well as free plane tickets for citizens of Taiwan residing in mainland China and willing to support pro-Chinese candidates.
Infiltration, cyberattacks, disinformation, there is nothing there that is not found in American or Russian strategies. However, the case of Taiwan is like no other, since it is a question of the same people located an arm of the sea away and the issue of its independence or its attachment to the continent crosses the history of the country. The conquest of the island will be a test for China not only of its military power, but of the real effectiveness of its intelligence and cyberattack services.
A rapid invasion/implosion of Taiwan would be a historic triumph for Xi Jinping. For the 23 million Taiwanese and for democracy, a tragedy of equal proportion.
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