In recent years, the alleged return of Russia to the African continent has attracted attention. It is not only the media that are interested in it, but also the diplomats and governments of countries which, since the fall of the USSR, have been in economic competition on the continent.
The increase in this interest began with the holding of the first Russia-Africa summit, in Sochi, in October 2019. The second summit, scheduled for 2022, helps to reinforce the hypothesis of the repositioning of Russia on the continent. Is this a real geostrategic turning point? Or can we rather suspect tactical reorganizations in search of markets for the export of weapons or the exploitation of rare minerals?
Divided positions on the Wagner group’s engagement in Mali
If it is difficult to answer this question immediately, the strong reactions of the “Western” chancelleries to any hypothesis of an increase in the Russian military presence in Africa already provide some elements of an answer.
At the heart of the controversy are the activities of the private military company Wagner, often presented as an unofficial armed wing of the Kremlin and active for years in areas of armed conflict on the continent, notably in Libya and the Central African Republic.
In September 2021, rumors about a possible contract between Wagner and the Malian authorities gave rise to radical positions. France and Germany vehemently opposed this alliance, as well as other countries, such as the United States, which militarily dominate the intervention systems in the Sahel through, in particular, Operation Barkhane and the MINUSMA.
In Mali, local populations have, for their part, demonstrated their support for private society, taking to the streets of Bamako to demonstrate, despite threats from certain foreign governments to leave Mali and to stop military cooperation. Despite these popular mobilizations, the Malian political class remains divided on the issue.
Indeed, Wagner’s soldiers drag a reputation of war machines without qualms and their actions could destroy stabilization efforts in the Sahel, especially in the context where the assassination of the head of the Islamic State in the Great Sahara (EIGS), announced in September 2021, could open avenues for community negotiations with groups seeking demobilization. However, purely military solutions in which Wagner’s employees would probably be involved would help to amplify the spirals of violence.
The tip of the iceberg or a brief fireworks display?
The failure of international interventions has become more than apparent: the series of deadly attacks targeting civilians in the Sahel countries bear witness to this. The failures of the fight against terrorism as well as the juxtaposition of the various security mechanisms, often perceived as obsolete by the local populations, arouse the resurgence of a strong nationalist rhetoric, punctuated by nostalgic speeches on the “return” of Russia. Indeed, linked to its Soviet past, this country remains, in the collective imagination, synonymous with support for Malian independence movements.
However, just as some African countries could have it both ways, during the Cold War, by alternating “allies” according to their own strategic interests, it is possible that the threat of an agreement with the Wagner group could be used to renegotiate. a margin of maneuver within the framework of the restructuring of the international military intervention systems. The reflection could also be taken to imagine that the use of the Wagner group is a form of more formal cooperation with the Russian authorities. Indeed, the recommendations on Russia’s strategy in Africa, prepared by Russian experts from the Moscow Higher School of Economics (HSE) in November 2021, are clear: the risks involved The activities of the Wagner Group should not be underestimated. And above all, they must above all be harmonized with the interest of the State, whereas in “Africa, they have sometimes acted in the interest of commercial entities, often without success”.
The current situation in Mali thus illustrates the disillusionment of the populations vis-a-vis political elites sometimes disconnected from their reality, but also – if not more – vis-a-vis international arrangements, and the failure of large-scale military interventions. Tensions around an alliance between the Malian authorities and the Wagner group have only revealed this dissatisfaction. And also underline the position of “Western” actors.
Closer than you think
The geopolitical reconfigurations in the Sahel influence the security situation in Mali, a French-speaking country with which Canada maintains important relations, whether in terms of economic or diplomatic cooperation. Instability in Mali has a direct impact on all the countries of the Sahel, which therefore affects all of Canada’s interests as well as the security of its citizens in the region.
For further
Read “Russia in Africa: A Search for Continuity in a Post-Cold War Era”, by Maxim Matusevich, published in Insight Turkey
Read an article published by RFI on a Russian film on Wagner’s activities: “Central African Republic: Tourist, a fiction in the service of Russian propaganda ”Read the article“ Russia and the coup d’état in Mali: historical heritage and geopolitical logics ”in the special issue of the Bulletin FrancoPaix devoted to the coup d’état in Mali