“The Kremlin does not yet intend to announce the mobilization” general. On Tuesday, Dmitri Peskov, spokesperson for the Russian presidency, had to answer, once again, this nagging question for months. While Russian forces have suffered several setbacks in Ukraine, some Russian voices are again calling for the “Special Military Operation” (SVO) to step up a gear. And, in particular, by calling up all the men declared fit to fight.
There are still few examples, but MP Mikhail Sheremet (from the United Russia presidential party) said in particular* that the country would not get “good results” without one “total mobilization” : “The status of the SVO should have changed a long time ago. We must mobilize all our forces.” The leader of the Russian Communist Party, Gennady Zyuganov, also put his foot in the dish*. “Over the past two months, the special operation has turned into a war” which was “declared by the Americans, Europe and NATO”he said.
“These positions remain marginal and the question is not really discussed in Russia”, says researcher Anna Colin Lebedev, however. And even if the option is advocated by several military bloggers, mad with anger after the setbacks suffered in the Kharkiv region. “These correspondents make up a very particular social group and only represent themselves, even if they are widely consulted. Today there is a ‘Telegram’ effect [un réseau social] which did not exist during the war in Chechnya, for example.”
Deputy Andrey Gurulev, Lieutenant General of the Reserve, said he was ready to put “the shoulder pads and the uniform”while adding that such a mobilization, at this stage, was not “not necessary”. This idea, moreover, annoys in high places. She is qualified as“useless” by Andreï Klimov, in charge of a committee at the Council of the Federation, which directly implicates foreign journalists. “I think they received an order and they will push this theme in their questions”he accuses in the Parliamentary newspaper*.
To be desirable, a general mobilization should still meet operational needs. And the recent Russian failures are not necessarily related to staffing issues. Alexander Khodakovsky, a battalion commander Vostok, instead blames* the misuse of troops, equipment problems and a failing organization. According to him, these problems must first be solved. By sending inexperienced men to the front, Russia would continue to “grind its resources in the meat grinder of war”.
Moreover, Russian capabilities to mobilize and accommodate such an influx of soldiers are limited. “Russia does not know how to train fighters on a massive scale. The very poor quality of military service, in its content, has also been criticized by the Russian command”insists Anna Colin Lebedev, who devoted her thesis to the question. “There are countless accounts of service during which the men never held a weapon. In the event of mobilization, who will train these future combatants if the officer corps is lacking?” And how will they be equipped?
Russia also has several other levers to raise troops. “The conscripts, whose training lasts a year, represent the main breeding ground”, explains Anna Colin Lebedev. These, in fact, can change status after four months to become soldiers under contract, of variable duration. “These are young people often from modest backgrounds and distant places, more sensitive to propaganda. A large part of the recruits do so of their own free will, because of the staggering salaries.” the New York Times thus evoked, in mid-July, salaries between 2,000 and 6,000 dollars per month for certain volunteers, while the average monthly salary is around 700 dollars.
However, “the experience of conscription in Russia in recent years, and this year more, shows a rather low rate of enlistment”recalls Dimitri Minic, researcher at the French Institute of International Relations, in The JDD (article reserved for subscribers). Anna Colin Lebedev also points out that the Ministry of Defense has not communicated the figures for the last phase of conscription, in mid-July. “The objectives are far from being achieved, according to the cross-checks of journalists who added up the figures by region.”
Another option: the call for volunteers in territorial defense battalions, under the aegis of the regions, even if the experiences are still mixed. Anna Colin Lebedev evokes, in another register, the “tremors” hidden recruitment among the reservists: “Testimonials show thirty or forty-year-olds who have a technical specialty, for example as a mechanic.” Summoned to military police stations for administrative reasons, they were forcibly enrolled, which is illegal.
“Russian power, probably, will never need to declare full mobilization.”
Anna Colin Lebedev, specialist in post-Soviet societiesat franceinfo
“Russia will probably mobilize, but on an ad hoc basisbelieves the researcher, perhaps in border regions of Ukraine, or with certain trades. But as invisibly as possible.”
The question, indeed, is eminently sensitive. “In Soviet times, the government demanded a lot of sacrifices in the name of the general interest and of the country.continues Anna Colin Lebedev. But since the fall of the USSR, there has been a strong aversion to sacrifice in the name of the general interest. The strategy of the Russians now is to hunker down.”
“The social contract between Russian power and its population is ambiguous”, she adds, because allegiance to the president is based on an economic dimension. Thus, “Putinism” has been based on a division of roles, for about twenty years. “The Russians have noticed that their standard of living has increased, thanks to the hydrocarbon kitty. In exchange, the power asks them not to intervene in politics.”
“The power has every interest in maintaining the idea of a special military operation, which does not concern the entire population.”
Anna Colin Lebedev, specialist in post-Soviet societiesat franceinfo
“If Vladimir Putin said that everyone should take up arms, it would challenge this social contract”, adds the researcher. This transition from the role of spectator to that of actor would have very uncertain consequences within the country. “This does not mean that Russians would take to the streets to protest against the war, but there is a good chance that a significant part of the population concerned will choose not to obey. This would obviously be a disavowal for the authorities. “
* Links followed by an asterisk are in Russian.