The downgrading of the Girondins de Bordeaux may not be over. Sportingly relegated to Ligue 2, the club saw its administrative demotion to National 1 confirmed by the appeal committee of the National Directorate of Control and Management (DNCG), Tuesday, July 5. In question, the financial difficulties of the club, too important in the eyes of the financial policeman of French football.
But the Girondins could still go down two floors. The specter of a bankruptcy filing hovers more than ever, as explained to franceinfo: sport Jean-Pascal Gayant, economist at the University of Le Mans.
Franceinfo: sport: can this demotion to National 1 be accompanied by a bankruptcy filing?
Jean-Pascal Gayant: It’s hard to say, but it’s a strong possibility. A bankruptcy filing would mean a demotion to National 3. There will remain the association, but that will be the end of the professional structure.
It is very difficult to imagine the model built by Gérard Lopez [le président du club] continue in National 1. Resources are very low in this division. We have to see how the shareholder reacts [les créanciers King Street et Fortress]but it is certain that this situation marks the failure of Lopez at the Girondins.
So there is the possibility of returning to National 1 with another president “invested” by American creditors?
One could imagine, yes. But this situation is quite unlikely. Because at some point, they will want to stop the fees: you can’t lose so much money with very little prospect of regaining your bet. The National 1 model is a revenue-free model. When we align expenses, especially in the payroll…
What would be the concrete consequences of a bankruptcy filing for the women’s section (6th in the last D1 Arkema)?
This may not be the priority. But I do not see how players who had an activity with professional contracts could be preserved.
What about the stadium, built in 2015 and for which the club paid rent of several million euros to Société Bordeaux Atlantique? Will there be repercussions for the taxpayer?
As with all stadiums built in public-private partnership, this will, in fact, continue to weigh. This is what happened at Le Mans, where the city replaced the club when the club fell into the amateur championship [en 2013 à l’issue d’un dépôt de bilan]. The city is the eventual owner of the stadium in the last resort, in the public-private partnership. The private group [le consortium Vinci-Fayat] claim rent from the city or urban community.
Is this situation comparable to the bankruptcy filings of Strasbourg (in 2011) or Bastia (in 2017)?
The earthquake is still more important. The club was precipitated into a catastrophic sporting situation in a short time, while Strasbourg had begun a form of sporting downgrading. There, that of the Girondins is very fast. It is also one of the five or six most successful clubs in France. It’s a thunderbolt in the French football landscape.