The time has come for Canada to adopt a new international policy in order to put an end to this incessant trial and error which has so discredited its image.
Posted yesterday at 1:00 p.m.
When he was elected to lead the country in November 2015, Justin Trudeau aimed to restore Canada’s place on the international scene. Two major pitfalls have thwarted this plan. First, hesitant, erratic international action without a clear direction, which soon undermined Canada’s credibility. Then, the failing leadership of the Prime Minister, advancing flower to the teeth, moved by a moral proselytism which transformed his word into a sterile sermon. Result: a worldly diplomacy, without substance and without effects, at a time when the diplomacy of the summits “propels the prime minister into the high spheres of international relations”, as the work of Nossal, Roussel and Paquin has shown.
Too often, when it comes to showing leadership, Canada looks like a late riser, quietly slipping behind its allies, as we saw again at the NATO summit of March 24.
The war in Ukraine constitutes a pivotal moment in contemporary history, unexampled since the implosion of the USSR. It marks a power policy that reshuffles the cards of global geopolitics and the collective security system inherited from the Cold War. The redefinition of Canada’s foreign policy will therefore take place in a context of turbulence and uncertainty rarely equaled.
One day it will be necessary to renew the dialogue with Russia, strategic axis of Eurasia, as with China, because “Eurasia being at the center of the world, whoever controls this continent controls the planet”, according to the formula of Z. Brzezinsky. Russia must remain at the center of Canadian foreign policy concerns. Sooner or later we will return to peace. Sooner or later, the post-Putin era will come, but the dream of Greater Russia and its age-old aspiration for global status will endure.
Western liberal hegemony contested by China and Russia, but also by the Arab world, is forcing Canada to rethink its alliances within the framework of resolute multilateralism.
Whatever happens, the United States will remain at the heart of our foreign policy. Despite temporary differences, the United States remains Canada’s closest ally. In fact, regardless of the government in power, “Canadian foreign policy has only one imperative, which is to maintain a relationship with the United States” (Denis Stairs, 1993). In the absence of global strategic thinking, Canada has often tended to model its political doctrine on that of the United States. An alignment as reassuring as it is cumbersome.
It is not in Canada’s interest to adopt a geopolitical posture too closely attuned to US policies. There is a great risk of exposing oneself in this way to the anti-Americanism that drives Sino-Russian foreign policy, as the Huawei affair brought to light.
The Sino-American rivalry will certainly mark the next decades. Its outcome will first depend on China’s ability to play its role as the world’s leading power and to give up the temptation to impose a totalitarian political order along the path of a “silk road” strewn with barbed wire; then, the ability of the United States to adjust to the end of its monopoly while continuing to offer an attractive and credible model of democratic society. As for the so-called American decline, it is only a sham best left to alarm bell ringers. Admittedly, the United States has lost its economic and nuclear supremacy, but without taking the slope of decline. The decrease in their relative power implies less a decline than a lowering, to use R. Aron’s formula, the historical vitality of the United States remaining intact despite a collective capacity trapped in an irrational political polarization.
Biden’s election did not lead to a return to global multilateralism. A return to a Wilsonnian policy is not an immediate possibility, as illustrated by the measured reaction of the United States in the Ukrainian crisis, skillfully mixing sanctions and threatening threats.
In Europe, the situation is confused and uncertain, while military dependence on the United States remains a decisive factor in national defense policies. The British, Europeans from outside, intend to become a key player again. A nuclear power, the United Kingdom will force the European Union (EU) to reckon with it in guiding European defence. In his Integrated review of security, defence, development and foreign policypresented in March 2021, the country already identified Russia as the “most significant” threat to international security, a foresight that unfortunately was lacking in its allies.
The common security policy will still be slow to emerge in a Europe of 27 which prefers to shelter under the umbrella of NATO. The war in Ukraine, however, marks a turning point for Europe at the same time as a brutal awareness of its dependence. The adoption on March 21 of the first European Defense White Paper is a long-awaited gesture of sovereignty.
At least a first step towards this objective, provided that this common defense is smoothly anchored to the NATO instrument, at a time when the United States has its sights turned towards Asia (the Quad strategic alliance, the new tripartite alliance AUKUS).
It was in Germany that the war in Ukraine led to the most profound changes, the FRG breaking with the “culture of restraint” inherited from Yalta. The adoption by the Council of the EU, on its own initiative, of the “strategic compass” confirms its status as a dominant European power.
On this new global chessboard, Canada will only be able to play a modest and episodic role, without ever being able to decisively influence the course of events. The implementation of a new international policy will be arduous and complex, as the horizon seems blurred and perilous. Canada can, however, contribute to forging this “common international consciousness” hoped for by Kissinger and more necessary than ever.