Historian Andreas Rödder examines the decline of the rule-based international order and the brief period of U.S. dominance from 1989 to 2003. He discusses the impact of the 2008 financial crisis and rising nationalism, particularly in Russia and China. Rödder critiques NATO’s eastward expansion and Germany’s foreign policy, advocating for a revival of civil society that prioritizes individual merit over collective identity. He argues for a liberal order focused on sovereignty and self-determination rather than imposing democratic ideals.
The Shift in International Order
Historian Andreas Rödder argues that while the concept of a rule-based international order appears to be fading, it is essential to clarify the timeline of American hegemony. The true peak of U.S. dominance was relatively brief, spanning from the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 until the aftermath of the Iraq War in 2003. The onset of the “war on terror” marked a pivotal shift; the U.S. sought to expand the liberal order not just among states but also internally within nations, promoting democracy and pursuing regime changes.
Consequences of Global Crisis
The global financial crisis of 2008 further complicated the Western model, particularly in how it was perceived by countries like China. This crisis ignited a resurgence of Russian and Chinese revisionism. Although the U.S. maintained its status as the leading global power, the era of unchallenged supremacy had concluded. Earlier assessments, such as those made by philosopher Hermann Lübbe and political theorist Francis Fukuyama, misrepresented the situation, underestimating the rise of nationalism and the violent conflicts that ensued in regions like Yugoslavia.
Rödder asserts that the West’s expansion, particularly NATO’s eastward movement, cannot be solely blamed for Russia’s aggressive stance. The unresolved defeat of the Soviet Union in the Cold War cultivated imperialistic ideologies in both Russia and China that stand at odds with the principles of a liberal order, which is founded on respecting the sovereignty of nations.
The situation was further complicated when NATO extended membership promises to Ukraine in 2008, a decision that Moscow viewed as a significant provocation. Instead of outright NATO membership, Rödder suggests that offering Ukraine security guarantees would have been a more constructive approach to balancing the competing interests of Russia and Eastern Europe.
Germany’s foreign policy, particularly its energy dependence on Russia, has come under scrutiny. The strategic missteps of both Germany and Eastern European nations, including their support for the Iraq War, reflect a broader trend of reliance on the U.S. for security. Germany’s “free hand” foreign policy has led to accusations of selfishness, as it prioritized economic interests over alliance solidarity, a stance that is unsustainable for a middle power in Europe.
As technological advancements like digitalization and artificial intelligence transform the global landscape, Rödder highlights a lack of visionary political strategies. The yearning for a return to a perceived better past can be misleading. History has shown that both nostalgia and utopian visions often lead to disillusionment.
Rödder proposes a revival of civil society as a potential solution, advocating for a model that emphasizes individual merit over collective identity. This approach, which champions the rights and qualifications of the individual, has the potential to navigate contemporary challenges more effectively than collectivist ideologies that divide society into victim groups or ethnic communities.
In conclusion, Rödder believes that the West should focus on maintaining a liberal order based on respect for sovereignty rather than imposing its ideals of democracy and equality globally. The future lies in fostering individual empowerment within a framework that recognizes the importance of self-determination among nations.