This analysis discusses the evolving concept of Europe’s strategic autonomy amidst geopolitical challenges, particularly following Trump’s election and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. It highlights the EU’s struggle to balance cooperation with the US and reduce dependencies on China, while facing internal divisions over defense spending and responses to the Ukraine crisis. The article emphasizes the need for decisive leadership from the European Commission to enhance military independence and navigate potential conflicts within the Union.
This could be a pivotal moment for redemption. President Emmanuel Macron has faced significant backlash in recent years for advocating “strategic autonomy” for Europe, often labeled as French arrogance, Gaullist obstinacy, or even anti-Americanism.
Now, just ten days post Donald Trump’s election win and two and a half years following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the concept of Europe’s strategic autonomy is gaining traction. Whether referred to as a buzzword or a critical objective, the essential question arises: How can the EU define and uphold its foreign and security policy goals with greater independence?
It’s crucial to clarify that this vision does not imply complete self-sufficiency. Alliances such as NATO and a partnership with the USA remain vital, but they too are evolving. The primary focus is on reducing self-imposed dependencies—economically on China and security-wise on the USA.
Facing Four Challenging Years Ahead
The prospect of four challenging years under Trump’s presidency looms ahead. His administration is likely to exert pressure on Europe, potentially imposing tariffs and diminishing commitments to defend Europe, including Ukraine. The EU’s capacity to navigate this challenge and maintain unity—or risk splintering into factions—will significantly influence the continent’s future. However, the outcome remains uncertain.
Current circumstances offer little encouragement. Macron expressed concern in April at the Sorbonne, stating, “Europe can also die.” Yet, failure is not a foregone conclusion. Europe has the opportunity to enhance its military independence and boost economic competitiveness, and that should be the ultimate aim.
Common Threats and Defense Challenges
The EU’s readiness for Trump 2 is a mixed bag. The European Commission appears stronger than individual member states, particularly in trade policy where the EU holds considerable power and autonomy. If Trump decides to raise tariffs suddenly, Brussels is prepared to respond accordingly, with product lists already on standby. This time, the stakes extend beyond just whiskey and American motorcycles.
However, many would prefer a cooperative approach, albeit at a potential cost. For the EU, this might entail adopting Trump’s tough stance towards China. Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, known for her hardline views on China, would likely support this. In contrast, member states such as Germany, particularly its automotive sector, are eager to avoid a trade conflict with Beijing, while Eastern European nations prioritize strong ties with the USA.
Defense matters are even more intricate. This domain is fiercely protected by sovereign nations, and the idea of a European army—first suggested by Churchill in 1950—remains elusive. National arms industries further complicate efforts to unify defense strategies. The crux of the challenge lies in the absence of a shared perception of threats across Europe. Concerns regarding Russia vary significantly, decreasing from north to south and from east to west. Nonetheless, there is a consensus that increased defense spending is essential.
Currently, European NATO members, nearly identical to the EU, allocate an average of about 1.8% of their GDP to defense, with this figure on the rise. This shift is partly attributed to Trump’s earlier threats of NATO withdrawal in 2018 if European countries did not increase their contributions.
However, the question remains: Where will the necessary funding come from? Options like budget cuts or collective debt face significant political obstacles. The notion of tightening belts to bolster military spending struggles to gain traction, except in the Baltic states.
Internal Divisions Over Ukraine
In this context, joint EU debt could serve as a solution. Kaja Kallas, the former Estonian Prime Minister and future foreign representative of the Union, has suggested this route. Macron previously floated the idea, garnering some support from Nordic countries. However, the initiative faces an uphill battle, largely due to Germany’s firm opposition.
Recently, the Commission has unveiled a new avenue: reallocating one-third of the cohesion fund, which offers compensatory payments within the Union, for defense and security purposes. This strategic move could release 392 billion euros over three years, creating significant opportunities to strengthen the European defense sector and fund arms production.
The true test of European autonomy, however, lies with Ukraine. The Russian invasion in February 2022 marked a significant turning point for the continent. The EU has responded decisively, providing substantial military and humanitarian assistance to Kyiv, amounting to 161 billion euros, while also welcoming four million Ukrainian refugees and implementing extensive sanctions against Russia.
This response has elevated the EU’s global standing, but it was closely coordinated with the last pro-transatlantic president in the White House. As Trump 2 approaches with strategies to swiftly resolve the conflict, the EU will face a historical challenge once again.
Will it successfully navigate this test? How will it respond to a potential American peace proposal that could undermine Ukraine’s sovereignty? There’s a genuine risk of internal discord within Europe.
Some nations labeled as “appeasers” (such as Hungary, Slovakia, and possibly Austria and the Czech Republic) may support the plan, while “hawks” (like Poland, the Nordic countries, and the Baltic states) could vehemently oppose it. Will Germany, often seen as the political fulcrum of Europe, rise to the occasion? Likely not, as a fragmented coalition is expected to govern Berlin, diminishing its leadership potential. Macron may seek to influence the situation, but his impact may be limited.
Brussels cannot afford to idly await leadership from Berlin and Paris. Time is of the essence. Under Ursula von der Leyen’s leadership, the Commission, equipped with greater strategic insight and political acumen than previous leaders, must act decisively to fill the Franco-German leadership void by engaging emerging players like Poland and the Nordic countries.
Denmark and the Netherlands should also be counted among those willing to confront Russia, signaling a potential new era of European unity and defense strategy.