Founder of the Raoul-Dandurand Chair in Strategic and Diplomatic Studies, the author is currently publishing with Somme toute/Le Devoir The eagle in danger?a book on American politics. We publish an excerpt from the conclusion.
What is the future of the eagle? Uncertain to say the least, turbulent certainly, and not only because of the results of the presidential election and the choice that the Americans will have made.
The United States will face challenges in the coming years the likes of which it has rarely experienced or lived through in its history. Will it decide to turn inward as it did for most of the 19th century?e century? Will they be the architects of the international system, such as their involvement during the 20th century?e century? Will they fall into the procrastination and about-faces characteristic of their behavior during the interwar period?
At least five issues will be critical to their future—and ours as Canadians—and will influence the trajectory they take.
1) How willing will future presidents be to maintain the international status of the United States? Status is often associated with reputation. To exercise leadership in international relations, a great power’s reputation must surpass that of all others, especially its competitors.
However, in this area, nothing is less certain. Reports from the Pew Research Center and the Institute for Global Affairs reveal that the American model is strongly questioned, particularly by the United States’ close allies (the United Kingdom, Germany, Japan, Canada).
This decline in popularity is particularly noticeable between the beginning and the end of Biden’s term. Washington’s management of world affairs has increasingly aroused suspicion and opprobrium, especially since the start of the war in Gaza. Nevertheless, Biden is perceived by European and Canadian public opinion as “the safest person to maintain the balance of the world”. The gap between Trump and him is spectacular, like the assessment of the two presidencies, which is diametrically opposed with regard to international trust in the United States. […]
2) What path will the Sino-American relationship take? Clearly, it is taking a sharp turn. The latest decisions taken by the Biden administration against China are further evidence of the protectionist regression of American trade policies, quadrupling customs duties on the import of electric vehicles, in addition to additional tariffs on batteries and semiconductors.
But as history has shown time and again, such a trend can only weaken the economy of the United States and the world. These decisions, based on electoral and not economic motives, weaken international trade institutions and the ability to regulate trade.
More broadly, the management of Sino-American relations shows a hardening of strategic competition. This management from the American point of view can lead to an open conflict or to a form of status quo while waiting for the allies of the United States in Asia to take more responsibility for their defense.
This strategy would allow Washington to gain time and hope to strengthen its economic and military capabilities in the region, so as to dissuade China from any aggression, particularly against Taiwan. This management will be decisive for the stability (or not) of the international system.
There is a fear that if this management yields to political and electoral pressures in the United States, it will not be able to avoid the occurrence of an escalation of tensions and a new Cold War, with diplomacy giving way to only security concerns and priorities.
3) What will be the outcome of the war in Ukraine and what role will the United States play? The decisions taken at the G7 in Italy in June seemed reassuring and suggest that the American commitment, in particular, will be maintained – at least until next January.
From the outset, the G7 granted Kyiv a loan of 50 billion US dollars for the reconstruction of the country. In addition, the security agreement between the United States and Ukraine provides for ten years of bilateral support – comparable to that towards Israel – to provide the military aid and equipment necessary for the defense of Ukrainian territory (but not troops).
However, the security agreement remains symbolic, because a political change in the White House could mean the end of the agreement concluded by Biden. Failing that and in the meantime, the commitment is reaffirmed and also sends a message to Moscow. Because this support is crucial in more than one way.
First, because without this support, Ukraine has little or no chance of triumphing militarily. Second, because the stability of Eastern and Northern Europe largely depends on this support and the feeling of security it provides: some believe that a war with Russia would be possible in the event of a defeat of Ukraine.
Finally, the current war represents a long-term “discount” option for Washington to combat Putin’s ambitions, as long as he remains in power. Another Russian aggression in European territory and in the wake of Ukraine would lead to escalation and would place Washington before a historic choice: openly confront Russia or ignore such an escalation and retreat into Fortress America. Truman had opted for the first choice; what would that of a future president?
4) What consequences will the war in Gaza have for the United States and its diplomacy? It is already having repercussions because, on the one hand, it has weakened Washington’s reputation in the Middle East and, on the other hand, it has diminished Biden’s chances of re-election.
Any political gains Biden may have enjoyed in the wake of the Ukraine war seem to have been erased by his almost unconditional support for Israel. In contrast, other presidents before him, such as Reagan and G.H. Bush, did not hesitate to threaten to cut off American aid to Tel Aviv in similar circumstances.
Biden has dithered, uncritically promoting support for Israel without resolutely advancing a long-term solution for Gaza, the West Bank, and the Palestinians, without taking the measure of the region’s inflammability. This hesitation will be costly in the medium term for American diplomacy and presents every risk of making it more marginal, less influential, in the Middle East.
The consequence would then be to permanently erode its credibility internationally. The easy solution, of course, might be for a future president to withdraw from regional affairs, but that would be an abdication of responsibility that is at odds with the history of contemporary American foreign policy.
By abandoning the Middle East while maintaining its unwavering military support for Israel, the United States could be seen as being on the “wrong side of the fence,” which would have the effect of accentuating anti-Americanism in the world and the isolationist drive of Americans.
Nor does it ignore the growing — perhaps inevitable — prospect of an Iranian decision to produce a nuclear arsenal in order to increase its power, preserve its theocratic regime and deter Israel.
5) What impact will Trumpism have on the future of American foreign policy? Beyond the possible re-election of the former president, the movement he represents — “America First” — is already marking and will undoubtedly define the next generation of American decision-makers.
The return of Trumpism to power—both in the presidency and in Congress—will make the United States just another “power,” with no appetite or capacity to maintain the democratic, institutional, commercial, and legal norms that, taken together, have made the United States a different power in history and represent, like it or not, the foundation of the current system.
Could this be the end of the Hegemon? A “normal power” might serve American interests in the short term, in Hal Brands’ view, but would pose a considerable risk to the world’s future in the long term. Just imagine that the “America First” of the 1930s, triumphant on the eve of World War II, had kept the United States out of it?
Suppose the Americans next time decided that their security was not as good as that of Taipei, Vilnius or Kyiv? Some might think that the time has come for American disengagement. But then we would have to accept a more unpredictable, more chaotic and more violent world.
Finally, there is also the fear that Trump’s return will irreparably alter the functioning of the American government and, in particular, its foreign affairs and defense bureaucracy so that it is entirely subordinate to the president’s wishes – and not repeat the constant clashes from 2017 to 2021 – which would have the effect of further undermining the international reputation of the United States.
Note: The reader will notice the different spellings from those usually used in The Duty for the cities of kyiv (Kyiv in this text) and Taipei (Taipei). The text above being taken from a book, we have left these spellings unchanged.